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CELL PHONES, POLICE RECORDING, AND 
THE INTERSECTION OF THE FIRST AND 
FOURTH AMENDMENTS 
CONOR M. REARDON† 
ABSTRACT 
  In a recent spate of highly publicized incidents, citizens have used 
cell phones equipped with video cameras to record violent arrests. 
Oftentimes they post their recordings on the Internet for public 
examination. As the courts have recognized, this behavior lies close to 
the heart of the First Amendment. 
  But the Constitution imperfectly protects this new form of 
government monitoring. Fourth Amendment doctrine generally 
permits the warrantless seizure of cell phones used to record violent 
arrests, on the theory that the recording contains evidence of a crime. 
The Fourth Amendment inquiry does not evaluate a seizing officer’s 
state of mind, permitting an official to seize a video for the very 
purpose of suppressing its contents. Moreover, Supreme Court 
precedent is typically read to ignore First Amendment interests 
implicated by searches and seizures. 
  This result is perverse. Courts evaluating these seizures should stop 
to recall the Fourth Amendment’s origins as a procedural safeguard 
for expressive interests. They should remember, too, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence surrounding seizures of obscene materials—an 
area in which the Court carefully shaped Fourth Amendment doctrine 
to protect First Amendment values. Otherwise reasonable seizures can 
become unreasonable when they threaten free expression, and 
seizures of cell phones used to record violent arrests are of that stripe. 
Courts should therefore disallow this breed of seizure, trusting the 
political branches to craft a substitute procedure that will protect law-
 
Copyright © 2013 Conor M. Reardon. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2014; Brown University, B.A. 2008. 
Many thanks to Professor Lisa Griffin, a wonderful advisor; to David Strollo, a good boss; and 
to Shauna Woods, an obliging consultant. Thanks as well to the staff of the Duke Law Journal, 
with special gratitude to Taylor Crabtree for his editorial labors and uncommonly sound advice. 
REARDON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  10:34 AM 
736 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:735 
enforcement interests without doing violence to First Amendment 
freedoms. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Jennifer Gondola left New Haven’s Pulse Nightclub on a 
Saturday night in June of 2012, the arrest was already in progress. The 
suspect, a young man, kicked and thrashed on the ground. Officers 
struggled to handcuff him.1 A crowd gathered and shouted. Gondola, 
along with several others in the bunch, produced her cell phone and 
began to film.2 
The video, posted on the Internet the next week,3 paints a grainy 
portrait of a messy encounter between citizens and police. The crowd 
voices support for the suspect as the tussle continues.4 Finally, an 
officer forces the man facedown onto the pavement and handcuffs 
him. Sergeant Chris Rubino, shouting and pointing, puts his foot on 
the prone suspect’s head. 
“Stop resisting!” shouts Rubino. 
“Put that shit on YouTube!” someone yells. 
“Why does he have his foot on his head? That’s crazy, yo,” says 
Gondola.5 
The encounter between the suspect and the police eventually 
began to calm, but the controversy surrounding the event escalated. 
An officer spotted Gondola filming.6 Rubino approached her and 
demanded that she stop. She refused on the ground that it was her 
“civil right” to record what was happening.7 
“Well, I have a right to review it,” Rubino allegedly replied.8 
Gondola promptly placed the phone in her bra; Rubino handcuffed 
her and instructed a female officer to remove it.9 The officer did, and 
 
 1. Paul Bass, Sgt. Arrests Video-Taker; IA Probe Begins, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 4, 
2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/sgt._probed_
after_arresting_video-taker.  
 2. Id. 
 3. Seized Video of New Haven Arrest Released, WTNH NEWS 8 (July 3, 2012, 3:01 PM), 
http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/new_haven_cty/rawlings-arrest-gondola-video#.UIGJVFFcRFI. 
 4. New Haven Indep., “Stop Resisting!”, YOUTUBE (June 12, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMOhKdyxn60&feature=player_embedded.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Bass, supra note 1. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
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Gondola was taken in for booking, her phone in the custody of the 
police whose actions were recorded on its data card.10 It would be 
returned to Gondola ten days later.11 
In the weeks that followed, some suggested that Gondola might 
file a civil rights lawsuit against Sergeant Rubino and the City of New 
Haven.12 The theory was that her video fell within the ambit of the 
First Amendment, and that Rubino had violated the Fourth 
Amendment by seizing the phone that held it. Indeed, the affair 
engendered constitutional concerns not only on the part of Gondola’s 
attorney,13 but also on the part of the public.14 For many who weighed 
in, schooled in the law or not, the notion that Rubino could seize a 
video that might showcase his own illegal conduct was intensely 
uncomfortable. 
Nevertheless, when Rubino told Gondola that he had a “right to 
review” the video and then ordered another officer to take her 
phone,15 he almost certainly spoke truthfully and acted lawfully. The 
Fourth Amendment’s exigent-circumstances doctrine permits police 
to effect a search or seizure, absent a warrant, to prevent the 
imminent loss of evidence.16 As long as an officer has probable cause 
to believe the seized item is evidence of a crime, and has objectively 
reasonable grounds to believe he must act immediately to preserve 
that evidence,17 the seizure is reasonable notwithstanding the officer’s 
subjective motivation18 or the mere evidentiary nature of the seized 
material.19 That calculus changes but little when police seize items 
protected by the First Amendment. In such cases, Zurcher v. Stanford 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Paul Bass & Thomas MacMillan, State Wins Delay To “Research” Camera-Grabbing, 
NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 13, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/
index.php/archives/entry/video_shows_sgt._.  
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. (“If ‘any member of the media is filming anything that might involve a crime,’ 
cops could ‘shortcut the legal process and the legal protections everyone has in the name of 
protecting evidence.’” (quoting Gondola’s attorney, Diane Polan)).  
 14. See, e.g., okaragozian1, Comment to Paul Bass, Rubino: I’ll Be Vindicated, NEW 
HAVEN INDEP. (Jun. 7, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/
archives/entry/rubino_ill_be_vindicated (“[The] 4th Amendment . . . prohibit[s] the ‘taking’ of 
the device . . . .”). 
 15. Bass, supra note 1.  
 16. Brigham City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 17. Berglund v. City of Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935, 943–44 (D. Minn. 2001). 
 18. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404. 
 19. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978). 
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Daily20 requires only that the procedural strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment be applied with “scrupulous exactitude.”21 The theory is 
that when properly observed, Fourth Amendment procedure affords 
“sufficient protection” to First Amendment interests.22 
Should Gondola press her claim, the City of New Haven might 
rest comfortably on Berglund v. City of Maplewood,23 a case applying 
Zurcher to an exigent-circumstances seizure. In Berglund, the 
plaintiff, a newsman, argued and fought with police at a banquet.24 His 
camera ran throughout the encounter.25 He claimed that the police 
were excessively forceful; the police, that he engaged in disorderly 
conduct.26 Berglund was arrested, and the police tried to obtain the 
tape of the encounter from his coworker.27 When the coworker 
refused to release it, the police seized the tape without a warrant.28 In 
an action under 42 U.S.C § 1983,29 Berglund alleged that, because his 
video of the violent arrest was First Amendment material, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the seizure.30 
The District Court for the District of Minnesota disagreed. 
Because Berglund’s camera was running during the confrontation, it 
was reasonable for police to believe that it contained evidence of a 
crime—Berglund’s disorderly conduct.31 It was likewise reasonable for 
police to think that evidence might be lost if they did not seize the 
tape, because Berglund’s coworker “was in the position to destroy the 
video recording . . . [and] the tape could be destroyed, erased or 
tampered with if they did not take it . . . .”32 Berglund’s First 
Amendment interests did not figure in the exigent-circumstances 
analysis at all. 
 
 20. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).  
 21. Id. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1964)) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 22. Id. at 565. 
 23. Berglund v. City of Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D. Minn. 2001).  
 24. Id. at 940–41. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 940. 
 27. Id. at 941. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 has not been amended since Berglund brought 
his suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 30. Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 942. 
 31. Id. at 943–44.  
 32. Id. at 944.  
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The seizure of Gondola’s phone neatly tracks Berglund. 
Gondola, like Berglund, recorded throughout the confrontation,33 
during which the recorded suspect engaged in behavior that might 
reasonably be thought criminal.34 Had she left the scene with her 
phone, Gondola, like Berglund’s coworker, would have been “in the 
position to destroy the video recording”35 by simply deleting it. 
Moreover, Gondola’s demeanor during the arrest—sympathetic 
toward the suspect, hostile toward the police—would bolster the 
inference that she would not preserve evidence to be used against the 
suspect in court.36 Finally, even if the requirement of “scrupulous 
exactitude” can ever meaningfully enhance protection for First 
Amendment materials—any constitutional provision, it seems, ought 
to be scrupulously applied under all circumstances—it counted for 
little in Berglund, and presumably would not avail Gondola either.37 
In all this, Officer Rubino’s subjective motivation would be 
irrelevant.38 His conduct would enjoy an identical shield whether he 
legitimately desired to preserve evidence of a crime or simply wanted 
to dispossess Gondola of a recording that depicted his own 
misconduct.39 
 
 33. Bass, supra note 1.  
 34. In Connecticut, a person is guilty of interfering with an officer if he or she “obstructs, 
resists, hinders, or endangers any peace officer” in the performance of the peace officer’s duties. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167a (2010). The suspect’s conduct during the arrest—kicking, 
thrashing, profane shouting—seems more than adequate to support the charge. See New Haven 
Indep., supra note 4.  
 35. See Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 944.  
 36. See Bass & MacMillan, supra note 11 (describing an exchange in which Gondola 
encourages the suspect to “keep quiet” so as to avoid later maltreatment at the hands of police). 
 37. See Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 943–44 (engaging the exigent-circumstances analysis in 
full without even mentioning the protected nature of the seized recording). 
 38. See Brigham City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006). 
 39. This Note does not contend that Rubino did seize Gondola’s phone to suppress its 
contents, only that he constitutionally could have. A recent story from Texas brings the problem 
into even sharper focus. See Selwyn Crawford & Travis Hudson, Witnesses to End of Chase 
Where Garland Officer Fired 41 Shots Say Police Deleted Cell Phone Photos, Video, 
DALLASNEWS.COM (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:20 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/
crime/headlines/20120911-witnesses-to-end-of-chase-where-garland-officer-fired-41-shots-say-
police-deleted-cellphone-photos-video.ece. During an automobile chase, a police car hit the 
suspect’s truck. Id. An officer fired forty-one shots into the truck, killing the suspect. Id. A 
witness claiming that police gave the suspect inadequate time to follow an exit order filmed the 
scene using his cell phone just after the event. Id. The witness said that after he finished filming, 
officers seized his phone and returned it four days later—with the video deleted. Id.  
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In sum, as the doctrine stands today, no part of the exchange 
between Rubino and Gondola violated the Constitution of the United 
States. This Note argues that should not be so. 
From Paul Revere’s engraving of the Boston Massacre40 to the 
images of Rodney King’s beating in Los Angeles,41 citizens who 
record and publicize the actions of law-enforcement officials have 
served the core First Amendment purpose of placing the deeds of 
government officers before the public for critical examination.42 For 
the authors of Cato’s Letters43—writings “essential to an 
understanding of the [F]irst [A]mendment”44—the right of the public 
to air official misdeeds was the best sign, and the surest guarantee, of 
a free people and a healthy government: “A free people will be 
shewing that they are so, by their freedom of speech. . . . [I]t is the 
part and business of the people, for whose sake alone all public 
matters are, or ought to be, transacted, to see whether they be well or 
ill transacted.”45 
In recent years, the proliferation of handheld camera phones and 
the ease of publishing video on the Internet have allowed citizens like 
Gondola to engage First Amendment tradition with considerably 
more ease than has ever been possible.46 Cheap, simple, and effective, 
 
 40. See Jonathan Eric Pahl, Note, Court-Ordered Restrictions on Trial Participant Speech, 
57 DUKE L.J. 1113, 1117 (2008) (describing the public outcry that followed the Massacre and the 
publication of Revere’s work). 
 41. See N. Stewart Hanley, Note, A Dangerous Trend: Arresting Citizens for Recording 
Law Enforcement, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 645, 655–56 (2011) (relating the story of King’s 
arrest, the public release of the film, and the riots that followed the officers’ acquittal at trial). 
 42. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To the founding 
generation, the liberties of speech and press were intimately connected with . . . the right of the 
people to see, examine, and be informed of their government.”). 
 43. JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, 
CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS (Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty 
Fund 1995) (1720). 
 44. David Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 446 
(1983).  
 45. Thomas Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same Is Inseparable from Publick 
Liberty, in 1 CATO’S LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER 
IMPORTANT SUBJECTS, supra note 43, at 110, 111. 
 46. And they have engaged it with enthusiasm. See Stephanie Claiborne, Comment, Is It 
Justice or a Crime To Record the Police?: A Look at the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute and Its 
Application, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 485, 494 (2012) (“There are thousands of postings on 
YouTube . . . from civilians that have recorded police officers abusing authority while making 
arrests.”).  
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recording the police in the digital age offers a unique opportunity47 for 
citizens to serve “a cardinal First Amendment interest” by “gathering 
information about government officials in a form that can readily be 
disseminated.”48 So it has been that conduct like Bay Area Rapid 
Transit Officer Johannes Mehserle’s shooting of Oscar Grant,49 the 
tasing of college student Andrew Meyer at a political event,50 and 
Rubino’s heavy-handed arrest in New Haven has been placed 
immediately in the public eye, engendering debate, outcry, and calls 
for change.51 
This Note argues that to ensure the vitality of this opportunity, 
courts should reconsider the application of the Fourth Amendment in 
cases like Gondola’s. In short, it argues that when a citizen uses a cell 
phone to record video of an arrest, police should not be permitted to 
physically seize the phone under the exigent-circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement.52 Because of the First Amendment 
 
 47. See Steven A. Lautt, Note, Sunlight Is Still the Best Disinfectant: The Case for a First 
Amendment Right To Record the Police, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 349, 354 (2012) (“In 1991 [the year 
of King’s assault], the chances that someone with a video camera was ‘watching’ were relatively 
small . . . . [T]echnological advances of the last decade have ushered in a new, unprecedented 
era of heightened police visibility.”). 
 48. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 49. See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for 
Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes To Preserve the Civilian’s Right To Record Public 
Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 488 (2011) (“Mehserle pins . . . Grant face down 
against the ground, draws his gun, and fires. . . . [T]he videos instantly appeared on YouTube 
and social media websites.”). 
 50. See Lautt, supra note 47, at 355 (“One illustrative example shows officers holding down 
and [t]asing Andrew Meyer, a University of Florida student who had disrupted a campus forum 
where Senator John Kerry was speaking. . . . The incident was captured on video from several 
different angles and created an Internet phenomenon.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Lautt, supra note 47, at 355 (“The [Meyer] videos were also instrumental in 
sparking serious debate over the use of Tasers on college campuses and a broader debate over 
police use of force in general.”); Sean Maher, Protest Against BART Police Expected To Draw 
1,000, OAKLAND TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.insidebayarea.com/oakland-bart-
shooting/ci_11442605 (“More than 1,000 people are expected to march and . . . protest against 
the BART police killing of Oscar Grant III . . . . The public outcry has been in response to 
witness cell phone videos leaked to the media . . . .”). 
 52. Some of the arguments that apply to cell phone seizures also apply to the seizure of 
other devices that can be used to record arrests, like digital cameras or camcorders. Other 
arguments are unique to cell phones. See infra Part III.B. This Note focuses strictly on the 
seizure of cell phones used as recording devices for three reasons. First, the Note uses the 
Gondola case as a jumping-off point, and Gondola used a cell phone. Second, nearly all the 
other citizen-recorders in recent headlines used cell phones when they recorded arrests. See, 
e.g., Alderman, supra note 49, at 488 (“In the age of the iPhone . . . it was little surprise that the 
passengers captured the footage [of Oscar Grant’s shooting] on cell phones equipped with 
digital video cameras . . . .”); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First 
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concerns they engender, such seizures should be deemed 
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.53 
Outside that narrow constitutional constraint, legislatures would 
remain free to craft procedures that balance the needs of law 
enforcement with the protection of speech. After surveying a range of 
permissible options, this Note urges a policy recently enacted in the 
District of Columbia, under which officers are instructed to “seize” 
the needed evidence—a video file—by obtaining a duplicate of the 
file, dispossessing the citizen of neither the phone nor the recording.54 
Analysis proceeds in four Parts. Part I makes the case for a First 
Amendment right to film police activity in public areas, concluding 
that either of two separate theories supports the existence of such a 
right. Part II examines the interplay between the Fourth and First 
Amendments in two contexts. In the first area, the seizure of 
allegedly obscene materials, the Supreme Court has sought to protect 
First Amendment interests by imposing procedural strictures beyond 
the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. It has justified those 
enhanced protections by reference to two First Amendment concerns: 
a wariness about prior restraints and a fear of chilling protected 
speech.55 In the second area, the use of a warrant to search a 
newspaper office in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court seemed to 
adopt a less speech-protective approach. It defined the scope of the 
newspaper’s protection by the procedural strictures of the Fourth 
 
Amendment, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2011) (“In the aftermath of the Iranian election during 
the summer of 2009, authorities sought to impede reporting on efforts to suppress opposition 
demonstrators. Yet cell phone videos disseminated over social-networking sites illuminated 
both official abuse and the scope of civil resistance.”). Third, the seizure of a cell phone 
implicates some interests not at play in the case of, for instance, a camcorder seizure, see infra 
Part III.B, so the First Amendment calculus differs from one to the other. Rather than assess 
the constitutional significance of seizures across a broad spectrum of devices, this Note adopts a 
narrower focus.  
 53. This argument is in many ways a particularized application of Professor Akhil Amar’s 
admonition that Fourth Amendment doctrine should take account of “constitutional 
reasonableness”: “In thinking about the broad command of the Fourth Amendment, we must 
examine other parts of the Bill of Rights to identify constitutional values that are elements of 
constitutional reasonableness.” Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 757, 805 (1994) (footnote omitted).  
 54. See infra Part IV.C. The term “seize” is here used in the colloquial sense, not the 
constitutional sense. Determining whether and when the District’s policy amounts to a Fourth 
Amendment seizure of a person, her phone, or her video file is beyond the scope of this Note. 
Much more importantly, it is unnecessary in this piece, which focuses on only those cases in 
which the presence of exigent circumstances justifies a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. See supra notes 33−37 and accompanying text. 
 55. See infra Part II.A.  
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Amendment, not the substantive values of the First. But the Court 
did so only after carefully considering and ultimately rejecting the 
argument that searches like the one before it would impose prior 
restraints on speech and chill expression.56 Part III returns to the 
question of exigent-circumstances seizures of cell phones. Using 
Rubino’s seizure of Gondola’s cell phone as the paradigm, it argues 
that such seizures can function as egregious prior restraints on speech 
and likely deter citizens from recording police. It therefore concludes 
that cell phone seizures should not be governed by Zurcher’s broad 
rule. Like obscenity seizures, cell phone seizures are good candidates 
for heightened protections crafted to insulate First Amendment 
values. Part IV considers several potential safeguards, concluding that 
two interests—the First Amendment interest in government 
monitoring, and law enforcement’s interest in preserving crime 
evidence—are best served if police officers “seize” video by 
mandating its electronic transmission, not by physically seizing cell 
phones. 
This Note therefore argues that courts should deem seizures like 
Gondola’s unreasonable, trusting that legislatures can prescribe a 
procedure that serves the needs of police without doing violence to 
the First Amendment. 
I.  THE CASE FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FILM POLICE 
“[T]here is practically universal agreement,” wrote the Supreme 
Court in Mills v. Alabama,57 “that a major purpose of [the First] 
Amendment [is] to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”58 It can hardly be doubted that the act of recording law-
enforcement officers, and submitting images of official conduct for 
evaluation by the public, lies close to the heart of the First 
Amendment’s spirit. The question is whether existing constitutional 
doctrine accommodates such behavior. This Part examines four 
theories of First Amendment protection that have been advanced by 
commentators or considered by courts. It dismisses the first two as 
doctrinally unsound, but concludes that each of the latter two theories 
supports the claim that the act of recording police is within the aegis 
of the First Amendment. 
 
 56. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565−66 (1978); see infra Part II.B.  
 57. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
 58. Id. at 218. 
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A. Recording as Expressive Conduct Per Se 
A citizen silently recording an arrest is not “speaking” in the 
usual sense. But the First Amendment extends protection to conduct 
that is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.”59 One 
commentator argues that the recording act meets this threshold, and 
can claim protection as an expressive act calculated to send a message 
in and of itself: “[A]larm or distrust of officers, or emotional support 
for an accused.”60 
This theory is likely foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.61 In 
Rumsfeld, the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, “an 
association of law schools and law faculties,”62 argued that law 
schools’ exclusion of military recruiters from their campuses qualified 
as expressive conduct, intended to express disapproval of the 
military’s practice of discriminating based on sexual orientation.63 The 
Court disagreed, holding that such conduct was not “inherently 
expressive” because it did not communicate a clear message without 
additional accompanying speech.64 The absence of recruiters from 
campus might indicate only that “the law school’s interview rooms 
[were] full,” or that the military preferred to interview elsewhere.65 
The claim that recording police activity is expressive conduct 
suffers from the same infirmity: recording, without more, is 
ambiguous. Impassive filming might indicate support for the victim 
(by monitoring official conduct), support for the police (by gathering 
evidence of a crime and the attendant arrest), or support for nobody 
in particular (in the fashion of an objective newsgatherer). The 
recording act likely finds no constitutional shield as expressive 
conduct. 
 
 59. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 409 (1974)) (quotation mark omitted). 
 60. Mario Cerame, Note, The Right To Record Police in Connecticut, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 385, 417 (2012).  
 61. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 62. Id. at 47–48. 
 63. Id. at 51–53.  
 64. Id. at 66. 
 65. Id. 
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B. Recording, Standing Alone, as Falling Within a “Right To Gather 
Information” 
An enticing theory of protection for recording rests on 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,66 in which a plurality of the 
Court held that “the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of 
speech and press,” as well as assembly, protects the right to observe 
proceedings at criminal trials.67 The Court reasoned that “[p]eople 
assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but also 
to listen, observe, and learn,” and that traditionally, the public had 
been permitted access to criminal proceedings because public 
presence “has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of 
what takes place.”68 It is plausible to argue that the “integrity and 
quality” of police conduct is every bit as important as the “integrity 
and quality” of judicial conduct, and the spaces where recording tends 
to occur are as public as a courtroom.69 Recording, the argument 
concludes, should therefore fall comfortably within the protective 
scope of Richmond Newspapers. The syllogism is sound as far as it 
goes, but its major premise, Richmond Newspapers, is flawed. 
First, Richmond Newspapers is arguably at odds with Zemel v. 
Rusk,70 in which the Court held that a ban on travel to Cuba—though 
it compromised the appellant’s efforts to collect information about 
U.S. foreign policy—did not implicate the First Amendment.71 It is 
easy to see why “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with 
it the unrestrained right to gather information;”72 it is harder to see 
why Zemel should come out differently than Richmond Newspapers. 
Americans travelled freely to Cuba until the 1961 ban,73 just as 
citizens have traditionally enjoyed access to courtrooms.74 The 
appellant in each case sought access to a traditionally open forum to 
 
 66. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).  
 67. Id. at 577–78 (plurality opinion). 
 68. Id. at 578.  
 69. See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 49, at 488 (describing the Mehserle shooting, which 
occurred on a subway platform); Bass, supra note 1 (describing the plaza where Gondola 
recorded the arrest).  
 70. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 71. Id. at 16–17. The Court held that the law was a restriction on action, not on speech. Id. 
 72. Id. at 17. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
(“[A] trial courtroom also is a public place where the people generally . . . have a right to be 
present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and 
quality of what takes place.”). 
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collect information of public import.75 And it is “hard to contend that 
the way in which a government operates its criminal justice system is 
of any greater concern from a democratic-decisionmaking point of 
view than the impact of its foreign policy.”76 
Second, as Zemel suggests, a robust First Amendment right to 
“gather information” is simply impractical.77 Gathering information is, 
after all, incidental to practically the entire universe of human 
conduct. Affording that conduct constitutional privilege would throw 
wide the First Amendment’s doors to an enormous range of behavior 
entirely divorced from any affirmative act of speaking. As Professor 
Barry McDonald points out, such a rule “confuse[s] means with 
ends.”78 That is, the Framers valued the acquisition of information, 
but they chose to facilitate it by protecting the speech constituting the 
information, not by policing the acquisition directly.79 
Third, the Court has been decidedly chary about extending 
Richmond Newspapers beyond its origins in the criminal courtroom. 
In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing 
Corp.,80 for instance, the Court considered a law that denied access to 
address information of arrested persons for commercial purposes.81 
The plaintiff argued that Richmond Newspapers should be extended 
to embrace these facts.82 But as Professor McDonald notes, the 
majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions all accepted that 
“California could have withheld the arrestee address information 
from the public without violating the First Amendment,” and none so 
much as mentioned Richmond Newspapers.83 Professor McDonald 
concludes that, in United Reporting, “the Court signaled that any 
person attempting to expand the Richmond Newspapers right of 
access beyond its current moorings may well bear a significant burden 
in doing so.”84 
 
 75. Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards 
a Realistic Right To Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 326 
(2004).  
 76. Id.  
 77. See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16–17 (“There are few restrictions on action which could not be 
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.”). 
 78. McDonald, supra note 75, at 327 (emphasis omitted).  
 79. Id. at 327.  
 80. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).  
 81. Id. at 35.  
 82. McDonald, supra note 75, at 301.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 302.  
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Thus, the facts of police recording present a fair argument from 
Richmond Newspapers, but the case is unlikely to prove a font of 
meaningful protection. The plea for First Amendment solicitude is 
not best made with a focus on the act of recording alone. 
C. ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez: Recording as Conduct Integral to 
Wholly Protected Speech 
The first winning argument for constitutional protection couches 
recording as part and parcel of a continuing act of speech. In ACLU 
of Illinois v. Alvarez,85 the Seventh Circuit relied on this reasoning to 
strike down an eavesdropping statute that proscribed the audio 
recording of any conversation in the absence of consent from all 
parties.86 
The argument works from the premise that “[a]s a general 
matter, ‘state action to punish the publication of truthful information 
seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.’”87 It then looks backward 
from dissemination of the recording, undoubtedly protected, to the 
conduct necessary to produce it in the first instance,88 and recognizes 
that there is “no fixed First Amendment line between the act of 
creating speech and the speech itself: . . . ‘The process of 
expression . . . has never been thought so distinct from the expression 
itself that we could disaggregate Picasso from his brushes and 
canvas . . . .’”89 
“This observation,” the Alvarez court reasoned, “holds true 
when the expressive medium is mechanical rather than manual.”90 
And because “‘[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech may 
 
 85. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 86. Id. at 586, 596. The ACLU desired to “implement a ‘program of promoting police 
accountability by openly audio recording police officers without their consent.’” Id. at 588. 
 87. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 
443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)). 
 88. This view requires the assumption that dissemination is intended; otherwise, it smacks 
of Richmond Newspapers and an unbounded right to gather information. Courts have generally 
been willing to make that assumption. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586, 596 (reasoning 
backward from dissemination when the ACLU sought to record police as part of its “police 
accountability program”); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Gathering 
information about government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others 
serves a cardinal First Amendment interest . . . .”).  
 89. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596 (quoting Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 
1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 90. Id. That is, when the object of regulation is a camera, not a paintbrush. 
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operate at different points in the speech process,’”91 to proscribe the 
creative act is functionally to prohibit the dissemination of the created 
product.92 The front-end ban implicates the First Amendment as 
surely as a back-end regulation, and the recording act merits the full 
protection of the Speech Clause.93 
This is not to suggest that the intent to gather and disseminate 
information transforms any restriction on conduct into a restriction 
on speech. Zemel should not have come out differently if the 
challenger had wanted to write a news article about Cuba. And this 
Note does not quarrel with the result in, for instance, Pell v. 
Procunier,94 in which the Court held that the press enjoys no First 
Amendment right to enter prisons to interview prisoners.95 This Part 
asks whether the government may curtail information gathering in a 
place the citizen has a right to be, not whether it must allow the 
citizen to access certain places so that she might gather information 
there. The argument is not that the government must facilitate speech 
by throwing wide the prison doors, but that it must suffer speech in 
accordance with the First Amendment’s negative injunction. 
D. Glik v. Cunniffe: Protection Under the Press Clause 
The second persuasive argument for protection differs little from 
the one advanced in Alvarez, but warrants special mention. In Glik v. 
Cunniffe,96 the First Circuit held that the First Amendment protects 
the right of private citizens to film “government officials engaged in 
their duties in a public place,”97 and seemed to ground the right in the 
province of the press. 
The first part of the analysis in Glik largely paralleled Alvarez’s 
reasoning: “Gathering information about government officials in a 
 
 91. Id. (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010)).  
 92. See id. at 597 (“If . . . the eavesdropping statute does not implicate the First 
Amendment at all, the State could effectively control or suppress speech by the simple 
expedient of restricting an early step in the speech process rather than the end result.”). 
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 94. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
 95. Id. at 832−35. 
 96. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).  
 97. Id. at 82. In Glik, a man walking near Boston Common saw three police officers 
arresting a suspect. Id. at 79. He thought the officers were being rough with the suspect and used 
his cell phone to film the arrest from a comfortable remove. Id. at 79–80. The officers ordered 
him to stop, then arrested him for violating Massachusetts’s wiretap statute, disturbing the 
peace, and aiding in the escape of a prisoner. Id. at 80. Glik was his § 1983 action. Id. at 79–80. 
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form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First 
Amendment interest.”98 The First Circuit did not articulate the source 
of this right within the First Amendment, and used neither the term 
“free speech” nor the term “free press.” But in the second part of its 
analysis, the court emphasized that the challenger’s behavior was 
protected notwithstanding his lack of affiliation with the organized 
media: the “public’s right of access to information is coextensive with 
that of the press.”99 Constitutional protection for newsgathering, 
wrote the court, “cannot turn on professional credentials.”100 
This invocation of the principle that the Press Clause protects a 
function, not a profession,101 suggests a right nestled within the 
freedom of the press rather than the freedom of speech. That 
suggestion is at odds with nearly four decades of jurisprudence that 
has “mainly treated the Press Clause as a superfluous subset of the 
Speech Clause,”102 but at least one commentator has argued that the 
Press Clause can naturally cabin a “right to gather information” in a 
way the Speech Clause cannot—and is therefore the sensible source 
of the right.103 Glik does not stake out that position in so many words, 
but the case might stand for a second theory of protection, one resting 
on a reinvigorated Press Clause. 
* * * 
It does not really matter whether Alvarez’s speech theory or 
Glik’s press theory carries the day. Each is at heart the same: the act 
of gathering information by recording rides to protection on the 
coattails of intended dissemination. No matter which clause does the 
work—whether a prohibition on recording restricts the dissemination 
of “speech” at square one, or such a proscription imperils the 
“press”—the First Amendment protects a right to record public 
officials performing their duties. 
Indeed, at least two Federal Courts of Appeals have announced 
such a right without articulating any doctrinal justification at all. In 
 
 98. Id. at 82. 
 99. Id. at 83. 
 100. Id. at 84. 
 101. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not 
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the 
public generally.”). 
 102. McDonald, supra note 75, at 258.  
 103. Id. at 354–55.  
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Smith v. City of Cumming,104 the Eleventh Circuit held that “[t]he 
First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what 
public officials do on public property,” specifically to “record matters 
of public interest.”105 The court did not announce which clause does 
the work, or how. Likewise, in Fordyce v. City of Seattle,106 the Ninth 
Circuit simply recognized a “First Amendment right to film matters 
of public interest,”107 without saying more. Protection by ipse dixit 
admittedly fails to satisfy. But the federal reporters are bereft of cases 
denying protection to the recording act, and the full protection of the 
First Amendment stands as the law of four circuits. 
In sum, the starting point is this: whatever the theory, all citizens 
enjoy the constitutional right to film official actions undertaken by 
the police in the public square.108 
II.  THE INTERSECTION OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS 
“What is significant to note,” wrote the Court in Stanford v. 
Texas,109 is that the history of the Fourth Amendment “is largely a 
history of conflict between the Crown and the press.”110 That “history 
of conflict,”111 characterized by the use of general warrants to seize 
publications tending toward seditious libel and dramatized in English 
cases like Entick v. Carrington112 and Wilkes v. Wood,113 set the stage 
for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment as a barrier between the 
 
 104. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000). Smith concerned a § 1983 
claim in which the plaintiff alleged he had been prevented from videotaping police activity. Id. 
at 1332. 
 105. Id. at 1333. 
 106. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995). Fordyce, like Smith, was a § 1983 
action, arising from the plaintiff’s arrest while filming a local protest. Id. at 438. 
 107. Id. at 439. 
 108. This recording right is (like all speech) “subject to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.” Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011). Because police recording by 
definition occurs during and near sensitive law-enforcement operations, laws designed to limit 
interference and protect bystanders (including filmers) will cabin the particulars of the 
recording act. But the core right, to record “an arrest in a public space . . . [without] interfer[ing] 
with the police officers’ performance of their duties,” id., runs as deep as any protection found 
within the First Amendment. 
 109. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).  
 110. Id. at 482. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). 
 113. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.). 
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prying state and the private papers of the citizenry.114 Constitutional 
limits on searches and seizures, in other words, were from the start 
bound up with First Amendment concerns.115 
Part II considers the interplay of the First and Fourth 
Amendments in two more contemporary arenas. In the first, the 
Court’s line of cases on the seizure of alleged obscenity, doctrine has 
been driven by two concerns peculiar to the First Amendment: 
unwillingness to abide prior restraints on expression and fear of 
chilling protected speech. Part II.A shows that in these cases, First 
Amendment substantive values, not Fourth Amendment procedural 
strictures, have defined the contours of limits on seizures. 
But in the second area—the Court’s decision in Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, concerning an evidentiary seizure from a newspaper 
office—the Court held just the opposite, defining the substantive 
protections of the First Amendment by the Fourth’s procedural 
limitations.116 Part II.B considers a holding that seems on its face to 
have renegotiated the limits by which the Constitution protects 
expressive material made subject to the government’s power to seize. 
Taken together, these two areas of doctrine will frame later 
discussion about how the Fourth Amendment bears on Jennifer 
Gondola’s right to film an arrest. 
A. Obscenity and the First and Fourth Amendments 
The lion’s share of the case law addressing the “collision between 
the Fourth Amendment and the First Amendment” has arisen in the 
context of obscenity.117 In that area, the uncertain nature of the line 
between that which can be legitimately proscribed and that which is 
constitutionally protected118 has given rise to thorny questions 
 
 114. Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 
875–77 (1985). 
 115. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
112, 133 (2007) (“The First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments share a common background in 
concerns about seditious libel.”); William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal 
Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 402–03 (1995) (“Entick and Wilkes are classic First Amendment 
cases in a system with no First Amendment . . . .”). 
 116. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564–65 (1978).  
 117. Tattered Cover v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Colo. 2002) (en banc). 
 118. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), defines unprotected obscenity; its standard has 
often been criticized as unclear. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with sufficient 
specificity and clarity to . . . prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of 
the attempt to suppress unprotected speech . . . .”). 
REARDON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  10:34 AM 
752 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:735 
concerning the state’s power to seize prohibited obscene materials. 
The Court’s answer has often been that the normal strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment are not equal to the task of protecting the First 
Amendment interests at stake—that “[a] seizure reasonable as to one 
type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different 
setting or with respect to another kind of material.”119 The Court has 
justified the imposition of heightened procedural requirements by 
reference to two First Amendment concerns: a wariness about prior 
restraints on expression and a fear of chilling protected speech. 
1. The Seizure of Obscenity and Prior Restraint.  “If one constant 
exists in Supreme Court [F]irst [A]mendment theory, it is that ‘[a]ny 
prior restraint on expression comes to . . . [the] Court with a ‘heavy 
presumption’ against its constitutional validity.’”120 The chief concern 
animating the prior restraint doctrine is that the hand of the 
government censor will operate to exclude disfavored speech before 
the speech reaches the public market.121 In the context of obscenity 
seizures, this danger is particularly acute. The indefinite nature of the 
obscenity standard, and of statutes that track that standard, lends 
itself to discretionary official action that suppresses protected speech 
as well as proscribed obscenity.122 The Court has long taken care to 
guard against that. 
In Marcus v. Search Warrant,123 the Court recognized that a 
search warrant arguably unobjectionable in another context may 
constitute an impermissible prior restraint when aimed at 
presumptively protected speech. In Marcus, a Missouri judge issued a 
search warrant for a periodical distributor’s warehouse on the 
strength of an officer’s affidavit that it housed obscene magazines.124 
The warrant authorized the seizure of all “obscene materials” located 
at the warehouse, and the executing officers seized “[a]pproximately 
11,000 copies of 280 publications.”125 Writing for the Court, Justice 
 
 119. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973). 
 120. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment 
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 53 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).  
 121. See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 736–37 (1961) (“The public’s opportunity 
to obtain the publications was . . . determined by the distributor’s readiness and ability to outwit 
the police by obtaining and selling other copies before they in turn could be seized.”).  
 122. See supra note 118.  
 123. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). 
 124. Id. at 722. 
 125. Id. at 722–23.  
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Brennan—after a lengthy ode to the Fourth Amendment’s origin as a 
safeguard against the suppression of speech and press126—
characterized the warrant as an impermissible prior restraint on 
expression.127 
Whether a similar warrant could be issued for the seizure of 
“gambling paraphernalia or other contraband,” wrote Justice 
Brennan, was beside the point.128 Absent preseizure procedures 
designed to “focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,” a 
narrower warrant eliminating police discretion, and “an adversary 
proceeding on the issue of obscenity,” imposition of a prior restraint 
on dissemination was impermissible.129 Despite a statutory provision 
for “rapid trial of the issue of obscenity” following seizure, the Court 
invalidated the authorizing Missouri law.130 Adversary action, the 
Court indicated, must precede the imposition of restraint.131 
The Court took up the question again in A Quantity of Copies of 
Books v. Kansas,132 there confronting the seizure, by warrant, of all 
1,715 copies of thirty-one titles from a distributor.133 The procedures 
observed in A Quantity of Copies of Books exceeded in rigor those 
followed in Marcus. The warrant named particular titles to reduce 
discretion in execution, and the issuing judge conducted an ex parte 
inquiry, in which he “scrutinized” seven books, and found grounds to 
believe they were obscene.134 
This, wrote Justice Brennan for the plurality, was not enough: 
“[S]ince the warrant here authorized the sheriff to seize all copies of 
the specified titles, and since [the distributor] was not afforded a 
hearing on the question of . . . obscenity . . . before the warrant issued, 
 
 126. See id. at 724 (“[T]he struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound 
up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power.”); id. at 729 (“This history was, 
of course, part of the intellectual matrix within which our own constitutional fabric was 
shaped.”).  
 127. See id. at 736 (“[A]n effective restraint . . . was imposed prior to hearing on the 
circulation of the publications in this case, because all copies on which the police could lay their 
hands were physically removed from the newsstands . . . . The public’s opportunity to obtain the 
publications was thus determined by the distributor’s readiness and ability to outwit the 
police . . . .”). 
 128. Id. at 730–31. 
 129. See id. at 732–38. 
 130. Id. at 737–38. 
 131. Id. at 736–38.  
 132. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964). 
 133. Id. at 208–09 (plurality opinion). 
 134. Id. at 208. 
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the procedure was . . . constitutionally deficient.”135 Justice Brennan 
again emphasized that the First Amendment does not necessarily 
abide seizures of expressive material that might be permissible with 
respect to other items: “It is no answer to say that obscene books are 
contraband, and that consequently the standards governing searches 
and seizures of allegedly obscene books should not differ from those 
applied with respect to narcotics, gambling paraphernalia and other 
contraband. We rejected that proposition in Marcus.”136 
A Quantity of Copies of Books thus stands for the proposition 
that when a seizure operates as a restraint on a seller’s distribution of 
each copy of a particular title, the seizure is impermissible if not 
preceded by an adversary hearing on obscenity. An otherwise 
sufficient warrant will not cure the constitutional defect. 
In two later cases, Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia137 and Roaden 
v. Kentucky,138 the Court invalidated the seizures of films from adult 
theatres. In Lee Art Theatre, a warrant issued “solely upon the 
conclusory assertions of [a] police officer” who had viewed the film.139 
The Court held that without judicial scrutiny, the procedure was not 
one “‘designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.’”140 
In Roaden, the Court held that the warrantless evidentiary seizure of 
a single reel of film incident to the theatre manager’s arrest for 
displaying obscenity involved the same infirmity.141 What is 
remarkable about Lee Art Theatre and Roaden is not the procedural 
particulars either case announced for obscenity seizures—each 
focused only on the lack of preseizure scrutiny by a judge, not on the 
absence of preseizure adversary hearings142—but the Court’s 
sensitivity to seizures that operate as prior restraints on expression: 
[T]he material seized fell arguably within First Amendment 
protection, and the taking brought to an abrupt halt an orderly and 
 
 135. Id. at 210. 
 136. Id. at 211–12. 
 137. Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968) (per curiam). 
 138. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).  
 139. Lee Art Theatre, 392 U.S. at 637. 
 140. Id. (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)). 
 141. See Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504 (“Such precipitate action by a police officer, without the 
authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is, in 
those circumstances, unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards.”). 
 142. In his Roaden concurrence, Justice Brennan wrote that the Kentucky statute was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it did not require such a hearing before the seizure of 
obscene materials incident to arrest. Id. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
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presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition. Seizing a film 
then being exhibited to the general public presents essentially the 
same restraint on expression as the seizure of all the books in a 
bookstore. . . . [R]estraint of . . . expression, whether by books or 
films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of 
reasonableness. . . . [W]e examine what is “unreasonable” in the 
light of the values of freedom of expression.143 
Roaden’s conception of restraint is broad and speech protective. 
The purpose of the seizure in Roaden was not, as in Marcus or A 
Quantity of Copies of Books, to remove objectionable material from 
circulation. It was rather to gather evidence in a criminal case.144 The 
officer did not seize thousands of publications, as in the prior cases. 
He took only one copy of the film.145 Roaden’s touchstone of concern 
is neither the seizure’s purpose nor the quantity of the items seized; it 
is whether official action disrupts “orderly and presumptively 
legitimate distribution or exhibition.”146 When it does, the Court 
signaled, the action will be treated as a prior restraint and must clear 
the “higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness”147 expressed in 
Marcus, A Quantity of Copies of Books, Lee Art Theatre, and Roaden. 
In keeping with the principle that prior restraints on 
dissemination trigger heightened procedural requirements, the Court 
has declined to impose comparable procedural rigor in their absence. 
Heller v. New York148 was decided the same day as Roaden and 
involved, like Roaden, the seizure of one copy of an allegedly obscene 
film incident to the arrest of theatre employees.149 The Court 
nonetheless upheld the seizure, on the ground that “[t]here ha[d] 
been no showing that the seizure of a copy of the film precluded its 
 
 143. Id. at 504. Roaden’s language differs somewhat from the language in the earlier 
obscenity cases. Marcus, for instance, invalidated a seizure strictly by reference to the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, see Marcus, 367 U.S. at 738, but Roaden found that a seizure was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504. The difference is one 
more of mechanism than of meaning—Roaden simply defined Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness according to First Amendment interests, an operation very much in keeping 
with Professor Akhil Amar’s theory of “constitutional reasonableness.” See generally Amar, 
supra note 53.  
 144. Roaden, 413 U.S. at 497–98 (“[T]he sheriff seized one copy of the film for use as 
evidence.”).  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 504. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973). 
 149. Id. at 485–86. In Heller, unlike Roaden, the seizure was by warrant. Id. 
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continued exhibition.”150 Likewise, in New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.,151 
the Court relied on Heller to hold that absent a “claim that the 
seizure . . . prevented continuing exhibition of the film,”152 the seizure 
of several copies of each of ten films from a rental store,153 made 
pursuant to a proper warrant and with an opportunity for a prompt 
adversary hearing on obscenity, was permissible.154 
In short, the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the seizure of 
allegedly obscene materials teaches that when the seizure of 
potentially protected expression functions as a prior restraint on 
dissemination, free speech controls. First Amendment interests justify 
the imposition of heightened procedural requirements on seizures 
that might be in another context unobjectionable. 
2. The Seizure of Obscenity and Chilling Effects.  The chilling-
effect doctrine, like the fear of prior restraints, is grounded in the 
concern that official action will prevent protected speech from 
reaching the market. The worry is not, as in the context of prior 
restraints, that direct regulation will sweep valuable speech into its 
restrictive scope.155 Rather, it is that individuals will unnecessarily self-
censor in an effort to steer wide of the regulated zone.156 
The possibility of chilling protected speech has special salience 
with respect to obscenity statutes because of the vagueness inherent 
in anti-obscenity laws that track the constitutional standard.157 If 
“[o]bscenity cannot be distinguished ex ante from constitutionally 
 
 150. Id. at 490. The Court wrote that if no other copies of the film were available, it would 
be necessary to “permit the seized film to be copied so that showing can be continued pending a 
judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding.” Id. at 492–93. 
 151. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986). 
 152. Id. at 874 (quoting Heller, 413 U.S. at 492). 
 153. Id. at 870. 
 154. Id. at 874–76. 
 155. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 344–45 (1967) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“To give these freedoms the necessary ‘breathing space to survive,’ the Court 
has . . . molded both substantive rights and procedural remedies . . . to conform to our 
overriding duty to insulate all individuals from the ‘chilling effect’ upon exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms generated by vagueness, overbreadth and unbridled discretion to limit 
their exercise.” (citations omitted) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))). 
 156. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959) (explaining that if a strict-liability anti-
obscenity statute were permitted to stand, “[t]he bookseller’s self-censorship, compelled by the 
State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public”). 
 157. See supra note 118. 
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protected sexually explicit material,”158 a sensible purveyor of any 
sexually explicit material errs toward the nondistribution of 
questionable matter, and so declines to disseminate some protected, 
nonobscene speech. Justice Brennan urged that this “potentially 
inhibiting effect”159 justified the wholesale scrapping of the Court’s 
efforts to define an unprotected sphere of obscenity.160 Justice 
Brennan’s view never commanded votes from more than three other 
Justices in any one case,161 and the Court has made clear that though 
the imposition of penalties under an obscenity statute that tracks 
Miller might chill protected speech, that alone will not invalidate the 
statute.162 But the Court has relied on chilling-effect reasoning to 
invalidate statues that fail to achieve Miller’s clarity and so work 
supposed deterrence on protected speech. In Reno v. ACLU,163 for 
example, the Court held that the Communications Decency Act164 
(CDA) was unacceptably vague because its definition of proscribed 
material lacked several of Miller’s narrowing elements,165 and 
therefore “present[ed] a great[] threat of censoring speech that, in 
fact, [fell] outside the statute’s scope.”166 
The seizure of alleged obscenity by a procedurally deficient 
warrant functions like, and raises the same concerns as, a vague 
statute like the CDA. A warrant like the one in Marcus, for 
example,167 injects uncertainty into the obscenity standard by vesting 
the executing officer with discretion to make the obscenity judgment 
 
 158. John T. Mitchell, An Exclusionary Rule Framework for Protecting Obscenity, 10 J.L. & 
POL. 183, 199 (1994). 
 159. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 88 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Smith, 361 U.S. at 151). 
 160. Id. at 103 (“[T]he concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with sufficient specificity 
and clarity to . . . prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt 
to suppress unprotected speech . . . .”). 
 161. Mitchell, supra note 158, at 197. 
 162. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989). 
 163. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
 164. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43, 
invalidated in part by Reno, 521 U.S. 844.  
 165. Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74. The statute banned the electronic transmission of “patently 
offensive” sexual matter, Communications Decency Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 134, but it lacked 
Miller’s requirement that the matter be sexual conduct “specifically defined by the applicable 
state law.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 873 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The 
CDA’s statutory definition of proscribed material further omitted Miller’s other two prongs: 
that the material appeal to the prurient interest and that the banned work, taken as a whole, 
lack serious political, scientific, literary, or artistic value. Id.  
 166. Id. at 871–74. 
 167. See supra notes 124−29 and accompanying text. 
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on the ground. That uncertainty in turn expands the scope of 
expression a distributor must self-censor to avoid seizure and 
prosecution. And so, in the obscenity-seizure cases, the Court was 
wary of the chilling effect of the power to seize. 
In Marcus, for instance, the Court opened its analysis with the 
observation that “a State’s power to suppress obscenity is limited by 
the constitutional protections for free expression.”168 It then 
elaborated on those protections in a discussion of Smith v. 
California,169 justifying by reference to Smith its holding that a warrant 
to seize obscenity must be treated differently than a warrant to seize 
other contraband.170 In Smith, the Court had held that states may not 
regulate the distribution of obscenity under a strict-liability regime. It 
rested that holding on the premise that such a scheme would 
unacceptably chill the distribution of nonobscene materials: 
[I]f the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the 
contents [of obscene materials] . . . he will tend to restrict the books 
he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have 
imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally 
protected as well as obscene literature. . . . The bookseller’s self-
censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting 
the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately 
administered.171 
Self-censorship, by Smith’s lights, functions as a de facto state-
imposed restriction on speech. Resting in part on that logic, the Court 
held in Marcus that Missouri’s defective procedures172 “lacked the 
safeguards which due process demands to assure nonobscene material 
the constitutional protection to which it is entitled.”173 Procedures 
inadequate to parse the obscene from the merely explicit in the first 
instance permit not only the direct suppression of protected speech, 
but the indirect suppression of expression that moved the Court in 
Smith. In Marcus, the Court sought to avoid that end by imposing 
heightened procedural requirements ensuring that warrants to seize 
obscenity would indeed target only the obscene.174 
 
 168. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730 (1961). 
 169. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).  
 170. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 730–31.  
 171. Smith, 361 U.S. at 153–54. 
 172. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text. 
 173. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 731. 
 174. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
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It is fair to wonder why the Court, intent on policing the chilling 
effect of seizures, would decline to impose heightened procedural 
requirements on evidentiary seizures of obscenity that do not 
represent prior restraints, as it did in Heller and P.J. Video.175 Indeed, 
P.J. Video has been criticized for “ignor[ing] . . . the chilling effect 
that even an evidentiary seizure can have on the dissemination of 
protected speech.”176 And in Maryland v. Macon,177 in which the Court 
permitted the evidentiary use of two obscene publications taken 
without a warrant from an adult bookstore,178 a dissenting Justice 
Brennan warned of consequences falling “not only upon the specific 
victims of abuse . . . but also upon all those who, for fear of being 
subjected to official harassment, steer far wider of the forbidden zone 
than they otherwise would.”179 
The Court has not explained why the chilling-effect rationale 
does not justify the extension of Roaden’s “higher hurdle” to mere 
evidentiary seizures, but the answer is probably, like every chilling-
effect inquiry, a matter of on-the-ground pragmatism.180 Because the 
Constitution bars prosecution for the private possession of 
obscenity,181 Marcus and its progeny—the entire line of obscenity-
seizure cases—concern vendors of objectionable material.182 In that 
context, one expects that only financially burdensome seizures would 
deter speech. The inclination to avoid shame, embarrassment, or 
invasion of privacy might be a relevant mover for seizures from the 
home, but those concerns likely lack salience when a commercial 
entity is the object of investigation. 
Viewed in that light, the Court’s imposition of heightened 
procedural burdens for prior-restraint seizures, but not for most 
evidentiary seizures, neatly tracks the capacity of each type of seizure 
to chill protected speech. The mass seizure of eleven thousand 
 
 175. See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text. 
 176. James H. Jeffries, Note, Seizing Obscenity: New York v. P.J. Video, Inc. and the 
Waning of Presumptive Protection, 65 N.C. L. REV. 799, 812–13 (1987). 
 177. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985). 
 178. Id. at 465.  
 179. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 180. See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 808 (1969) 
(“The chilling effect focuses attention on the practical consequences of state action . . . .”). 
 181. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 182. See, e.g., New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 869 (1986) (“[F]ive videocassette 
movies . . . had been seized from respondents’ store . . . .”); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 
717, 721 (1961) (“Appellant . . . is a wholesale distributor of magazines . . . .”). 
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books,183 or even the seizure of one reel of film that halts its planned 
exhibition,184 disrupts the ordered run of business and imposes 
financial burdens a merchant might seek to avoid by giving obscenity 
a needlessly wide berth. On the other hand, the seizure of less than all 
of a theatre’s copies of a film185 neither disturbs operations nor 
threatens profits. It therefore seems doubtful that a preseizure 
adversary hearing would insulate protected speech any better than 
prompt postseizure proceedings.186 Heightened procedural strictures 
for evidentiary seizures would impose burdensome niceties on the 
state without a correlative salutary effect on expression, and the 
Court has sensibly eschewed them. 
To summarize, the seizure of alleged obscenity represents a 
collision between the state’s power to seize and society’s freedom to 
speak. Guided by concerns about prior restraints and chilling effects, 
the Court has defined procedural requirements with reference to First 
Amendment interests, not Fourth Amendment authority. That is 
why, at first blush, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily seems to break with its 
precursors. 
B. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 
The First and Fourth Amendments collided again when Zurcher 
v. Stanford Daily came to the Court in 1978. Seven years earlier, 
demonstrators in Palo Alto had seized and occupied the offices at 
Stanford University Hospital.187 Some had attacked police officers.188 
Two days later, the Stanford Daily published photographs of the 
incident indicating that the photographer had witnessed the violence 
against police.189 
On the theory that the photographer might have captured an 
assault on film, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office 
 
 183. See Marcus, 367 U.S. at 723 (“Approximately 11,000 copies of 280 publications, 
principally magazines but also some books and photographs, were seized . . . .”).  
 184. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (“[T]he taking brought to an abrupt 
halt an orderly and presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition.”). 
 185. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973) (“There is no showing . . . that the 
seizure of the copy prevented continuing exhibition of the film.”). 
 186. See id. at 492 (“If . . . following the seizure, a prompt judicial determination of the 
obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding is available . . . , the seizure is constitutionally 
permissible.” (footnote omitted)). 
 187. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 550 (1978). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 551. 
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secured and executed a search warrant for the Daily’s offices.190 
Invoking the First Amendment status of the materials sought, the 
Daily pursued and obtained declaratory relief in federal district 
court.191 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.192 
The Supreme Court reversed. After reciting the protections 
conferred by obscenity cases like Marcus, A Quantity of Copies of 
Books, and Roaden,193 the Court held that the Daily’s First 
Amendment interests added nothing to its case: “Properly 
administered, the preconditions for a warrant . . . should afford 
sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened 
by warrants for searching newspaper offices.”194 
Zurcher, then, seems a departure from—indeed, a reversal of—
the Court’s approach in the obscenity cases. In defining the contours 
of protection, Zurcher looked not to the substantive values of the 
First Amendment, but to the procedural strictures of the Fourth. But 
Zurcher’s core holding—that “the preconditions for a 
warrant . . . should afford sufficient protection”195—is not merely a 
prescription for lower courts; it is a description of a set of facts that 
presented no danger of prior restraint or speech-chilling effect. 
Zurcher, in other words, is not a case unconcerned with the First 
Amendment or a fundamental break with Marcus’s line. It is merely a 
case grounded in circumstances that posed little threat to expression. 
Part II.B.2 argues that Zurcher is best read to reaffirm the concerns 
the moved the Court in Marcus and its progeny—and assuredly does 
not provide the government blanket authority to seize expressive 
materials, like Jennifer Gondola’s cell phone, so long as it observes 
the usual Fourth Amendment niceties. 
1. Zurcher’s Prescriptive Dimension.  Zurcher’s core holding—
that “the preconditions for a warrant . . . should afford sufficient 
protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by 
warrants for searching newspaper offices”196—is prescriptive. It 
broadly directs lower courts to measure the constitutionality of 
searches and seizures by reference to the Fourth Amendment, not the 
 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 552. 
 192. Id. at 553. 
 193. Id. at 564–65. 
 194. Id. at 565. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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First. That prescription seems to cast a wide net, and Zurcher stands 
basically for the proposition that First Amendment rights “are not 
deserving of more criminal procedure protections than other 
activities.”197 
Berglund v. City of Maplewood198 typifies the dismissive 
treatment of First Amendment interests that Zurcher is read to 
justify. The plaintiff in Berglund used a video camera to film an 
arrest—his own—and police seized the camera from his friend.199 The 
court first paid “lip service”200 to the notion that the “‘requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment must be applied with scrupulous exactitude’ 
when materials seized are protected by the First Amendment.”201 It 
next reasoned that the presence of exigent circumstances obviated the 
need for a warrant.202 It then held, with no discussion of the particular 
First Amendment interests at issue, that Zurcher and the Constitution 
had been satisfied.203 Berglund’s relegation of the First Amendment to 
the constitutional backseat is a rather straightforward application of 
Zurcher’s bare prescription.204 
 
 197. Solove, supra note 115, at 130. Zurcher’s language of course refers to newspaper offices 
and warrants, but the case is generally taken to sweep more broadly. See, e.g., Tattered Cover, 
Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (“The Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements in Zurcher can be read to mean that, beyond the ‘scrupulous exactitude’ 
requirement, the First Amendment places no special limitation on the ability of the government 
to seize expressive materials under the Fourth Amendment.”); infra notes 198–204 and 
accompanying text.  
 198. For further discussion on Berglund, see supra notes 23–32 and accompanying text.  
 199. Berglund v. City of Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935, 941 (D. Minn. 2001). 
 200. Schnapper, supra note 114, at 871. 
 201. Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 943 (quoting Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564). 
 202. Id. at 944 (“[Officers] believed that the tape could be destroyed, erased or tampered 
with if they did not take it from [the plaintiff’s companion].”). Noting that Zurcher was 
concerned only with warrants, the Berglund court cited Roaden for the proposition that the 
combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances is the equivalent of a warrant. Id. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Congress’s response to Zurcher, the Privacy Protection Act, prohibits some seizures of 
certain materials from a person who has “a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, 
book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication.” Privacy Protection Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2006). But the Act contains an exception that is animated when it is 
reasonable to believe that issuing a subpoena for sought materials would result in their 
“destruction, alteration, or concealment.” Id. § 2000aa(b)(3). The Berglund court treated this 
exception as coextensive with the exigent-circumstances exception to constitutional protection: 
“[F]or the same reasons . . . defendants did not need to obtain a search warrant under the 
exigent circumstances exception, the court concludes that defendants[’] actions satisfy the 
‘destruction of evidence’ exception to the Act.” Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 950. Gondola’s 
facts would presumably shake out similarly. 
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2. Zurcher’s Descriptive Dimension.  But consider Zurcher again: 
“[T]he preconditions for a warrant . . . should afford sufficient 
protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by 
warrants for searching newspaper offices.”205 That holding is not just 
an instruction to lower courts. It is also a description of the expected 
interplay of the Fourth and First Amendments grounded in Zurcher’s 
facts: the seizure by warrant of materials from the formal press.206 
Moreover, it is a description the Court offered only after lengthy 
consideration of two familiar concerns—the risk of prior restraint and 
chilling effects upon speech. In other words, though Zurcher’s First 
Amendment problem was somewhat different than those at issue in 
the obscenity cases,207 the Zurcher Court justified its holding by 
reference to the same First Amendment interests that drove Marcus 
and its progeny. 
a. The Absence of Prior Restraint in Zurcher.  The Daily argued 
that a subpoena, not a search warrant, was the proper vehicle to 
secure press photographs because a subpoena would “afford[] 
opportunity to litigate the State’s entitlement to the material it seeks 
before it is . . . seized.”208 This argument hearkened to Marcus’s 
preseizure adversary proceedings,209 and the Court drew the analogy: 
“The Court has held that . . . seizures . . . entirely removing arguably 
protected materials from circulation may be effected only after an 
adversary hearing and a judicial finding of obscenity.”210 
In rejecting the Daily’s argument, the Court did not broadly hold 
that outside the obscenity context, the state has blanket authority to 
seize First Amendment material if it properly observes Fourth 
Amendment procedure. Neither did it overturn the decisions 
 
 205. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
 206. See id. at 551 (“The warrant issued on a finding of ‘just, probable and reasonable cause 
for believing that . . . evidence material and relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of 
felonies . . . will be located [on the premises of the Daily.]’” (third alteration in original)). 
 207. When the state seizes alleged obscenity, the fear is that the vague nature of the 
obscenity standard will result in the seizure of protected speech. See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 
367 U.S. 717, 732–33 (1961) (“[O]nly one-third of the publications seized were finally 
condemned . . . .”). In contrast, the warrant in Zurcher doubtless targeted protected speech; the 
question was whether that should enter the Fourth Amendment calculus.  
 208. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566. 
 209. See Marcus, 367 U.S. at 737–38 (“[T]he restraint on the circulation of publications was 
far more thoroughgoing and drastic than any restraint upheld by this Court. . . . Mass seizure in 
the fashion of this case was thus effected without any safeguards to protect legitimate 
expression.”). 
 210. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566–67. 
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imposing enhanced procedural strictures on some obscenity 
seizures.211 It wrote much more narrowly, noting only that the instant 
facts presented no risk of prior restraint that would justify heightened 
procedural requirements: “[S]urely a warrant . . . such as the one 
issued here for news photographs . . . carries no realistic threat of 
prior restraint or of any direct restraint whatsoever . . . .”212 That is not 
reasoning that purports to govern the relationship between seizures 
and speech interests forever and in all circumstances. It is reasoning 
that found no impermissible restraint, and no constitutional harm, on 
Zurcher’s narrow facts. 
b. The Absence of Chilling Effects in Zurcher.  The Daily’s chief 
argument was that the use of search warrants against newspaper 
offices would exert a “profoundly chilling effect . . . on the ability of a 
journalistic organization to carry out its functions.”213 If such warrants 
could issue, the Daily argued, confidential sources would dry up for 
fear of investigation, and newspapers would decline to publish reports 
that might lead to invasive office searches.214 
The Court brushed off that argument, too—but not on the 
ground that the Daily’s parade of horribles was tolerable. The 
reasoning, rather, was that it would not occur at all: 
Nor are we convinced, any more than we were in Branzburg v. 
Hayes, that . . . the press will suppress news because of fears of 
warranted searches. . . . [F]ew instances in the entire United States 
since 1971 involv[e] the issuance of warrants for searching 
newspaper premises. This reality hardly suggests abuse; and if abuse 
 
 211. As made clear in P.J. Video, when, eight years after Zurcher, the Court recited the 
“special protections” afforded some obscenity seizures before declining to extend those 
protections to the evidentiary seizure before it. See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 
874–75 (1986) (“If such a seizure is pursuant to a warrant, issued after a determination of 
probable cause by a neutral magistrate, and, following the seizure, a prompt judicial 
determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding is available at the request of 
any interested party, the seizure is constitutionally permissible.” (quoting Heller v. New York, 
413 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1972))).  
 212. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567. The warrant did not issue until after the news article on the 
hospital occupation—the article to which the photographs were related—had been published. 
Id. at 551. 
 213. Brief for Respondent, Zurcher, 436 U.S. 547 (No. 76-1484), 1977 WL 189744, at *3. 
 214. Id. at *19–21, *23–24. 
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occurs, there will be time enough to deal with it. Furthermore, the 
press . . . is not easily intimidated—nor should it be.215 
Just as Zurcher conferred no express constitutional blessing on 
seizures that function as prior restraints, it did not say that evidentiary 
seizures of First Amendment material should always be permissible 
without regard for their tendency to chill protected speech. Indeed, 
the Court declared there would be “time enough to deal with” that 
brand of abusive seizure.216 Zurcher simply was not the case that 
compelled the Court to do so. 
Zurcher seemed to flip the obscenity calculus by defining speech 
protection by reference to Fourth Amendment procedure, not First 
Amendment substance, but the case rested on the same concerns as 
Marcus and its speech-protective progeny. Zurcher’s prescription 
depended on the Court’s factbound determination that warrants like 
the one before it carried no risk of prior restraint and no danger of 
chilling speech. When a seizure presents the threat of either or both, 
courts should ask whether Zurcher’s descriptive dimension—that the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirements extend “sufficient protection” to 
First Amendment interests217—still holds true. 
III.  “SUFFICIENT PROTECTION?” THE GONDOLA SEIZURE 
In Zurcher, the Court asserted that the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements afford “sufficient protection” to First Amendment 
interests when expressive materials are seized.218 Part III argues that, 
although that assessment accurately described Zurcher’s facts, it does 
not hold true for a “typical” citizen-recorder seizure like Gondola’s in 
New Haven. 
 
 215. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566 (citation omitted) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972)). In Branzburg, the Court held that no “journalist’s privilege” exempted reporters from 
revealing, before a grand jury, information gleaned from confidential sources. Branzburg, 408 
U.S. at 692. It is worth noting that in so holding, the Court pointed out that subpoenas to testify 
involve “no prior restraint,” id. at 681, and that the claimed “inhibiting effect” on speech caused 
by such subpoenas was “to a great extent speculative,” id. at 694. 
 216. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566. Perhaps disagreeing with the Court’s empirics, perhaps 
quarreling more with Zurcher’s application than with Zurcher itself, Professor Akhil Amar 
criticizes the case as failing to take true account of expressive interests: “The facts in Zurcher 
cried out for comparison with Wilkes . . . yet the greatest search and seizure case in Anglo-
American history went unmentioned and unanalyzed.” Amar, supra note 53, at 805. This Note 
takes no position on whether Zurcher had the empirics right, and, like Professor Amar, argues 
its rule should not stretch too broadly. 
 217. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565. 
 218. Id. 
REARDON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  10:34 AM 
766 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:735 
To review the archetype: A citizen observes an arrest in progress 
and exercises her First Amendment rights by using a cell phone to 
record it. The suspect resists; an officer uses force to subdue him. The 
exigent-circumstances doctrine entitles the arresting officer to seize 
the phone as evidence of a crime—resisting arrest or a similar 
offense—after determining that without the seizure, the evidence will 
be lost. Because that test does not inquire into the officer’s subjective 
state of mind, the Constitution permits the seizure whether the officer 
legitimately wishes to preserve evidence, or wants only to suppress a 
record of his own wrongdoing. 
By reference to the Court’s twin concerns in cases involving the 
seizure of protected expression—prior restraints and chilling effects—
this Part argues that the Fourth Amendment fails to extend 
“sufficient protection”219 to the First Amendment interests of citizens 
like Jennifer Gondola. 
A. Cell Phone Seizures and Prior Restraint 
In the Marcus line of cases, the Court imposed heightened 
procedural requirements for all obscenity seizures that operated as 
prior restraints;220 in Zurcher, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to 
Marcus’s principles.221 As discussed, the recording act is protected 
speech because it is incident to the ultimate speech act of 
dissemination.222 A crime-scene seizure, then, imposes a governmental 
barrier prior to the final act of speech.223 The threat of prior restraint 
therefore permeates Fourth Amendment doctrine as applied to the 
Gondola seizure. Indeed, for four reasons, this particular restraint is 
especially problematic. 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (“Seizing a film then being 
exhibited to the general public presents essentially the same restraint on expression as the 
seizure of all the books in a bookstore.”). 
 221. See supra Part II.B. 
 222. See supra Part I.C–D. 
 223. The seizure of Gondola’s camera disrupted the “presumptively legitimate distribution 
or exhibition” of her video just as surely as did the seizure in Roaden, see Roaden, 413 U.S. at 
504; Gondola’s footage did not reach the public until ten days after it was created, see supra 
note 11 and accompanying text. The seizure did not, of course, represent a final restraint on 
dissemination, but neither did any of the seizures in the Marcus line of cases. See, e.g., A 
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1964) (“Nor is the order . . . saved 
because, after all 1,715 copies were seized and removed from circulation, P-K News Service was 
afforded a full hearing on . . . obscenity . . . . [I]f seizure of books precedes an adversary 
determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridgement of the right of the public in a 
free society to unobstructed circulation of nonobscene books.”).  
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First, the restrained publication concerns truthful speech about 
the administration of government—speech at the First Amendment’s 
core.224 Nonobscene sexually explicit speech is not constitutionally 
“peripheral,”225 but “[f]reedom of expression has particular 
significance with respect to government because . . . here . . . the state 
has a special incentive to repress opposition . . . .”226 If any speech 
must be handled with kid gloves, it is core political speech like 
Gondola’s. 
Second, the restraint is imposed by an individual deeply 
interested in suppressing the speech.227 The circumstances 
surrounding the Gondola seizure underscore this point dramatically. 
Sergeant Chris Rubino, the officer who first demanded Gondola’s 
phone, was the very officer captured in the video with his foot on the 
handcuffed suspect’s head. That conduct, deemed excessive force by 
an internal investigation, later earned Rubino a fifteen-day 
suspension.228 Rubino’s incentive to block dissemination of the video 
can hardly be doubted, but the Fourth Amendment provided him 
authority to do it. 
In other words, present doctrine allows the government to 
restrain the dissemination of speech critical of the government 
because it is critical of the government;229 moreover, it permits 
imposition of the restraint by the government actor who is being 
criticized. As far as speech is concerned, it is as if incumbent political 
candidates had the power to temporarily bar from the airwaves those 
advertisements critical of their campaigns. That hardly represents 
“sufficient protection” of expressive interests,230 and it comports 
 
 224. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[A] major purpose of [the First] 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”). 
 225. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961) (“[T]he line between speech 
unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed or 
punished is finely drawn.” (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 
525)).  
 226. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.11 (1978) (quoting THOMAS 
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1966)) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 227. See Crawford & Hudson, supra note 39. 
 228. New Haven Sergeant Suspended for Excessive Force, NBC CONN. (Aug. 17, 2012, 2:28 
PM), http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/New-Haven-Sergeant-Suspended-for-Excess
ive-Force--166563406.html. 
 229. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 230.  Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978). 
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poorly with a jurisprudence that has refused to countenance even 
temporary restraints imposed by a disinterested magistrate.231 
Third, such a seizure restrains the dissemination of a unique item 
of media, and for a time keeps that item from the market entirely. 
One reason the Court disfavors prior restraints is that, unlike ex post 
penalties, they prevent speech from reaching the public in the first 
instance. That concern runs through the obscenity-seizure cases. As 
the Court wrote of the seizure in Marcus, “The public’s opportunity 
to obtain the publications was thus determined by the distributor’s 
readiness and ability to . . . obtain[] and sell[] other copies . . . .”232  
A seizure like the one in New Haven works a more significant 
deprivation. In A Quantity of Copies of Books, the state did not seize 
every extant copy of Backstage Sinner or The Wife-Swappers.233 The 
people of Kansas—or at least some people, somewhere—were 
presumably able to procure the titles from distributors other than P-K 
News Service.234 Not so in New Haven. When Rubino seized 
Gondola’s phone, only one copy of her video existed, because 
Gondola had just filmed the arrest and had not duplicated the file. 
For the ten days it was retained by the police, the video, unlike 
Backstage Sinner or The Wife-Swappers, was blocked entirely from 
public consideration. 
Fourth, the speech restrained in New Haven was time sensitive 
because it was news.235 One might plausibly criticize a case like A 
 
 231. See A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208–10 (1964) (invalidating 
a search warrant issued by a district judge who “scrutinized” the seized books in advance).  
 232. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 736 (1961). 
 233. See A Quantity of Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 211 (explaining that the distributor’s 
ability to circulate the titles depended on whether it undertook to procure other copies); see also 
id.. at 215 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the books’ titles). Likewise, in Roaden, Pulaski 
County seized one copy of Cindy and Donna—every copy owned by the theatre, but by no 
means every copy in the world. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 497, 504 (1973). 
 234. See A Quantity of Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 211 (“Their ability to circulate their 
publications was left to the chance of securing other copies . . . .” (quoting Marcus, 367 U.S. at 
736)). 
 235. The Court’s reluctance to countenance prior restraints on the publication of news is 
dramatically chronicled in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per 
curiam). In New York Times, the government sought to enjoin the Times and the Washington 
Post from publishing the “contents of a classified study” on American involvement in Vietnam. 
Id. at 714. The government asserted that publication would compromise efforts to end the 
conflict and secure the return of prisoners of war. Floyd Abrams, The Pentagon Papers After 
Four Decades, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 7, 12 (2011). Refusing to grant the injunction, 
Justice Stewart charged the government with an enormously high burden in his controlling 
concurrence: “I cannot say that disclosure . . . will surely result in direct, immediate, and 
irreparable damage to our Nation . . . . [T]here can under the First Amendment be but one 
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Quantity of Copies of Books for its somewhat formalistic approach to 
prior restraints: the challenged Kansas statute provided for a prompt 
postseizure hearing on obscenity,236 and perhaps the short delay in the 
public’s access to the seized books made, on the whole, little matter. 
Even if that reasoning withstands scrutiny with respect to salacious 
literature, it does not with respect to a video like Gondola’s. The New 
Haven footage depicted a recent event—an arrest that would have 
been reported as news, filmed or not. The natural and most effective 
time to disseminate video of an occurrence is in its immediate 
aftermath, not ten days later,237 and, though footage of a violent arrest 
might be newsworthy in its own right whenever published, it 
doubtless loses punch as the arrest recedes into the past.238 
B. Cell Phone Seizures and Chilling Effects 
Zurcher rested in part on empirical rejection of the chilling-
effects reasoning underlying decisions like Marcus. And so in 
determining whether Zurcher’s broad edict ought to govern the 
seizure of Gondola’s phone, it is appropriate to ask: If police are 
permitted to seize cell phones in situations like the one in New 
Haven, is it likely that citizens will decline to record police activity? 
For four reasons, the answer is almost certainly yes. 
First, in some circumstances, the evidentiary seizure of a cell 
phone could give rise to the owner’s criminal liability. A phone 
capable of recording police can obviously record other activities, too, 
generally in the form of pictures as well as videos. To retrieve the 
sought evidence, an officer would have to maneuver through other 
videos and photos stored in the phone’s memory. Any incriminating 
 
judicial resolution . . . .” New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). The Fourth Amendment was conceived in part as a means to secure the freedoms of 
speech and press. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. It is ironic that the government has 
more power to restrain speech, not less, in First Amendment cases that also implicate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 236. A Quantity of Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 213. 
 237. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 238. In New Haven, Gondola’s video was released on June 12, 2012—ten days after it was 
created—and still precipitated significant public reaction. See supra note 11 and accompanying 
text. But the video itself had become a news item several days earlier on June 4, when it was 
reported that Gondola had been arrested and her phone seized. See Bass, supra note 1. It is 
impossible to say whether the footage would have sparked any outcry or discipline against 
Rubino, see supra note 228 and accompanying text, had it been quietly released ten days after 
an arrest occupying no special place in the public memory. 
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material encountered in the process would become, under the plain 
view doctrine, evidence usable against the phone’s owner.239 
Such governmental windfall has convicted more than one hapless 
cell phone user. In United States v. Yockey,240 for instance, the 
defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license.241 When 
the arresting officer tried to turn off the man’s cell phone in 
compliance with police procedure, he accidentally accessed a photo of 
a naked teenager. The defendant was convicted on that basis of 
possessing child pornography.242 Similarly, in State v. Carroll,243 an 
officer retrieved a cell phone dropped by a fleeing suspect and 
noticed that the phone’s display screen was an image of the suspect 
smoking marijuana.244 That observation helped procure a search 
warrant for the defendant’s phone,245 and the search uncovered more 
incriminating evidence.246 
Whatever their salutary effect on law-enforcement interests, such 
occurrences hardly encourage the valuable practice of monitoring 
police. One expects that the indiscreet of society, knowing the 
contents of their own photographic libraries, would disincline toward 
filming an arrest—to the First Amendment’s loss. 
Second, a police officer retrieving one evidentiary video from a 
collection of other files might encounter files that are not 
incriminating, but are intensely private. In Newhard v. Borders,247 for 
example, an officer conducting an inventory search of an arrestee’s 
cell phone happened upon nude photos of the man and his girlfriend 
in “sexually compromising positions.”248 Amused, he shared the 
images with other officers.249 A 2010 study found that twenty-five 
percent of Facebook profiles belonging to college students contain 
 
 239. See, e.g., United States v. Yockey, 654 F. Supp. 2d 945, 957 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (“Police 
may seize, without a warrant, an item that is 1) in plain view 2) when it is observed from a lawful 
vantage point, 3) where the incriminating character of the item is immediately apparent.” 
(quoting United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Horton v. California, 
496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)))).  
 240. United States v. Yockey, 654 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 241. Id. at 949. 
 242. Id. at 948–50. 
 243. State v. Carroll, 778 N.W. 2d 1 (Wis. 2010). 
 244. Id. at 5. 
 245. Id. at 5–6, 30−31. 
 246. Id. at 6−7, 32. 
 247. Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
 248. Id. at 444. 
 249. Id. The court held that the arrestee had no constitutional remedy. Id. at 443.  
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“seminude or sexually provocative photos”250—and such photos are 
often captured first on a camera phone. Even more discreet forms of 
communication—say, expressions of endearment from a significant 
other—are likely not the sort of thing most people prefer to air 
publicly. In short, it seems reasonable for even the law abiding to 
desire that cell phone content remain private, and probable few 
would jeopardize that privacy interest for the sake of watching the 
watchmen. 
Third, the loss of a cell phone for ten days251 is enormously 
inconvenient. In a typical day, an average American cell phone user 
makes or receives more than thirteen calls on the device; that same 
person sends or receives forty-one text messages.252 More than half of 
people who own cell phones—and 77 percent of users between the 
ages eighteen and twenty-nine—regularly use their phones to access 
the Internet.253 Similar numbers use their phones to send email.254 It is 
unsurprising that nine out of ten cell phone users feel safer and more 
connected to family and friends because of their phones,255 and that 
nearly three out of ten “can’t imagine living without” their cell 
phones.256 It would be a conscientious citizen indeed who offered up 
ten days of communication and information seeking for the sake of 
some abstract constitutional value. 
Fourth, for citizen-recorders, there is little that counterbalances 
the disincentives to film. “[T]he press,” wrote the Court in Zurcher, 
“is not easily intimidated.”257 And it is true that the formal press has 
good reasons not to forgo publication for fear of a later search; a 
 
 250. Joy Peluchette & Katherine Karl, Examining Students’ Intended Image on Facebook: 
“What Were They Thinking?!”, 85 J. ED. FOR BUS. 30, 30 (2010). 
 251. See Bass & MacMillan supra note 11 (reporting that Gondola’s cell phone was returned 
after ten days). 
 252. AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND TEXT MESSAGING 3, 6 (2011), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/Americans%20and%20
Text%20Messaging.pdf.  
 253. MAEVE DUGGAN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., CELL PHONE ACTIVITIES 
2012, at 6 (2012), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/
PIP_CellActivities_11.25.pdf. 
 254. Id. at 7. 
 255. AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CTR., CELL PHONES AND AMERICAN ADULTS 2 
(2010), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Adults_Cell
phones_Report_2010.pdf. 
 256. PEW RESEARCH CTR., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT: SPRING 
TRACKING SURVEY 22 (2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Data%
20Sets/2012/April_2012_Mobile_Topline.doc. 
 257. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978). 
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compelling one is that news stories sell papers. No comparable 
incentive moves the citizen-recorder. The benefits of police 
monitoring distribute throughout society,258 but the costs fall only 
upon the person whose cell phone is seized as evidence. This calculus 
suggests a reverse tragedy of the commons—one in which almost no 
citizens use the public square to record police activity. 
In sum, Zurcher’s prescription for resolving the tension between 
the First and Fourth Amendments rested on empirical claims about 
the Fourth Amendment’s capacity to guard against the dangers of 
prior restraints and chilling effects on speech. Those claims accurately 
described Zurcher’s facts, but they do not hold true with respect to 
seizures like the one in New Haven. Such seizures allow for the 
imposition of prior restraints that threaten speech to a more 
significant extent than the procedures struck down in cases like 
Marcus. Moreover, the facts surrounding cell phone seizures suggest a 
strong possibility of speech deterrence. Recognizing these two 
dangers and hearkening to the principle of Roaden,259 courts should 
view cell phone seizures, like obscenity seizures, as good candidates 
for heightened protection. 
IV.  A NEW PRESCRIPTION 
Like the seizures of alleged obscenity in the Marcus line of 
cases—and unlike the facts in Zurcher—the exigent-circumstances 
seizure of a cell phone used to record a violent arrest presents the 
risks of prior-restraint and speech-chilling effects. Marcus and its 
progeny guarded against those threats by imposing procedural 
requirements beyond the normal dictates of the Fourth Amendment, 
chiefly in the form of mandatory preseizure adversary proceedings on 
the question of obscenity.260 That dictate, the Court reasoned, would 
 
 258. The chief benefit being greater adherence by police to norms of fairness and justice, as 
a result of the increased accountability that filming occasions. See Claiborne, supra note 46, at 
505–06 (“By recording the police, officers can be held accountable for their abuse of authority. 
Allowing citizens to record the police would encourage law enforcement officials to be on their 
best behavior.”).  
 259. “A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in 
a different setting or with respect to another kind of material.” Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 
496, 501 (1973). 
 260. See, e.g., A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964) (“It is our 
view that since . . . [the plaintiff] was not afforded a hearing on the question of the obscenity 
even of the seven novels before the warrant issued, the procedure was . . . constitutionally 
deficient.”).  
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adequately protect First Amendment interests while accommodating 
the state’s interest in regulating obscenity.261 
The trick in the context of cell phone seizures is to determine 
whether any procedures can guard against First Amendment harms 
while preserving the state’s interest in acquiring crime evidence. Few 
would argue, for instance, that police should not have authority to 
obtain a video that captures a shooting and the attendant arrest of the 
suspect. Society has a weighty interest in catching murderers, and if 
holding cell phone seizures unreasonable would prevent police from 
doing that, perhaps the First Amendment harm is worth the candle. 
A solution, then, must grant the police latitude to investigate 
crime, but allow Gondola to keep her phone. This Part explores three 
possible alternatives to physical seizure, concluding that the last—the 
“seizure” of video files by electronic transmission, not physical 
confiscation—can accommodate all interested parties.262 Given the 
existence of at least one less-intrusive, speech-protective alternative,263 
courts should hold physical seizures unreasonable, trusting the 
 
 261. See id. (“State regulation of obscenity must ‘conform to procedures that will ensure 
against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from 
obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 
58, 66 (1963))).  
 262. There is certainly authority for the proposition that the Constitution—or the Court—
can impose procedural requirements that seem more legislative than judicial. Marcus and its 
progeny, for instance, held that the First Amendment demanded adversary proceedings in 
advance of obscenity seizures, see supra Part II.A., and Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000), affirmed the constitutional provenance of Miranda warnings. Id. at 431–32. But here 
there is no need. If police officers are simply disallowed to physically seize cell phones that 
citizens use to film arrests, the political branches—generally responsive to the needs of law 
enforcement—should have no trouble following the example of the District of Columbia, see 
infra Part IV.C., and prescribing procedures that serve police within constitutional limits. 
 263. Granted, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not generally marked by the weighing of 
government alternatives in the same manner as, say, equal-protection case law. See, e.g., City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (“There is no evidence in this record 
that the Richmond City Council has considered any alternatives to a race-based quota.”). But 
inquiry into the existence of less-intrusive means is no stranger to the law of search and seizure, 
particularly when, as here, the manner of search or seizure is at issue. In such cases, the Court 
has often determined “reasonableness” by asking whether a certain level of intrusion was really 
necessary. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 935–36 (1995) (holding that a search of a 
dwelling may be unreasonable if officers do not first “knock and announce” because 
unannounced, forcible entry can damage property and cause undue intrusion—but that 
unannounced entry is reasonable if necessary to preserve officer safety or evidence); Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (explaining that when determining whether an officer used 
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he calculus of 
reasonableness . . . [contemplates] the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation”). 
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political branches to articulate and implement this new procedural 
safeguard.264 
A. Judicial Intervention 
The obscenity-seizure cases called for heightened judicial 
scrutiny in the form of adversary action;265 the Zurcher Court avowed 
its faith in the ability of magistrates to weigh First Amendment 
interests in crafting warrants for news offices.266 Requiring judicial 
involvement in cell phone seizures, rather than delegating blanket 
authority to the officer in the field, would doubtless be a sound 
starting point for increased protection of speech. 
But such a requirement runs headlong into the state’s interest in 
preserving crime evidence: the raison d’être of the exigent-
circumstances exception is that some evidence tends to disappear. A 
cell phone, itself mobile and concealable, possessed by an anonymous 
recorder who captures a video, which could easily be deleted instead 
of preserved and posted online, doubtless qualifies. In the “now or 
never”267 circumstances animating the exception, mandatory judicial 
intervention answers “never,” overbalancing toward speech 
protection while ignoring the interests of law enforcement. It is no 
solution. 
B. The Proportionality Principle and Crime Severity 
Zurcher fails to adequately protect First Amendment interests in 
the context of cell phone seizures because the same Fourth 
Amendment that justifies the legitimate evidentiary seizure of a 
recording of a shooting, and the shooter’s apprehension, also justifies 
the pretextual seizure of a video of a suspect who is resisting arrest. 
Professor Christopher Slobogin has argued for the increased use of a 
proportionality framework in Fourth Amendment doctrine. Under 
the proportionality principle, “[a] search or seizure is reasonable if 
the strength of its justification is roughly proportionate to the level of 
intrusion.”268 In a similar vein, Professor Jeffrey Bellin has criticized 
 
 264. Or—because this particular measure is not constitutionally mandated, see supra note 
262—implement any other procedure responsive to the concerns described in Part III. 
 265. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. 
 266. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978). 
 267. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973). 
 268. Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the 
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1998). Assuming the strength of a 
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the transsubstantive nature of Fourth Amendment doctrine, calling 
for the consideration of crime-severity distinctions in determining 
what searches and seizures are “reasonable.”269 It is tempting to posit 
a crime-severity framework as a means to protect First Amendment 
interests. Such a framework could permit the seizure of cell phone 
video for some crimes (like murder) but not for others (like resisting 
arrest). 
But crime-severity analysis is ill-suited to the task. As an initial 
matter, any effective doctrinal response to the problem of citizen-
recording must alleviate the chilling effect of seizures upon speech. If 
the authority of police to seize video depended on the categorization 
of the recorded crime, only citizens familiar with the system of 
categorization could safely predict whether they could record without 
fear of seizure. Such uncertainty would merely encourage citizens to 
“steer far wider of the forbidden zone than they otherwise would,”270 
and serve to chill the behavior that categorization was designed to 
promote. 
Moreover, to effectively guard against First Amendment harms, 
a crime-severity framework would have to classify a crime like 
resisting arrest as nonserious. That crime, after all, provides the 
Fourth Amendment hook for the paradigmatic seizure in New 
Haven.271 As a normative matter, the law should not characterize 
behavior that endangers a police officer as insufficiently serious to 
warrant robust investigation. As a practical matter, the line between 
resisting arrest and assaulting a police officer—surely a crime of high 
gravity—can be uncertain.272 Because classification of the crime at 
 
seizure’s justification increases with the magnitude of the underlying crime, the proportionality 
principle provides a theoretical basis for defining reasonableness by reference to crime severity.  
 269. Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing 
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2011). The “transsubstantive” 
Fourth Amendment, he writes, “generally treats all crimes alike. . . . [T]he legal standard for 
evaluating a search (or seizure) is the same whether a police officer suspects that a person 
jaywalked or is the Green River Killer.” Id.  
 270. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 476 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 271. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 272. Under Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-167a, a person is guilty of the class A 
misdemeanor of interfering with an officer when he “obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any 
peace officer” in the performance of the peace officer’s duties. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167a 
(2010). Under § 53a-167c, a person is guilty of the class C felony of assaulting an officer when, 
“with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer . . . from performing his or her 
duties,” he “causes physical injury to such peace officer.” Id. § 53a-167c. For a suspect who 
violently resists arrest—like the suspect detained by Sergeant Rubino—the only element 
separating the misdemeanor from the felony is physical injury to the officer. 
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issue would fall to the officer in the field, this approach would merely 
re-vest that officer with sufficient discretion to suppress a recording 
by seizure. It would thus scarcely avoid the danger of prior restraint 
that plagues the present doctrine. 
Finally, the facts of the New Haven seizure confound resolution 
by reference to crime severity because Gondola’s video recorded two 
wrongful acts: the suspect interfering with officers and Rubino 
employing excessive force in the arrest. Defining footage as subject to 
seizure strictly according to crime severity would create a doctrinal 
oddity in which the more egregiously an officer behaved on camera, 
the more likely police would be justified in effecting a seizure—a 
somewhat perverse result. That is not to say that police may not 
occasionally have a legitimate interest in preserving evidence of 
potential official misconduct, but it surely indicates that a crime-
severity framework, standing alone, is not the answer to the New 
Haven problem. 
C. A Technological Problem, a Technological Solution 
In the obscenity cases, the Court quieted First Amendment 
threats by mandating preseizure adversary proceedings to parse 
obscenity from protected speech. Zurcher presented a different issue 
because the seized materials were concededly protected, but the 
Court expressed faith that magistrates could tailor warrants to avoid 
the imposition of prior restraints on publication and the sort of 
unduly intrusive seizures that might chill press activity. Cell phone 
seizures seem to present an intractable problem: the sought material 
is First Amendment material, as in Zurcher, but here, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine can only deliver that material to the state if it 
countenances the risks of prior restraint and chilling effects. 
Advances in technology created Gondola’s problem; fittingly, 
they can solve it, too. If police “seize” cell phone video by obtaining 
an electronic duplicate of the sought file, instead of physically seizing 
the phone itself, First Amendment concerns dissipate without offense 
to law-enforcement needs. Courts, recognizing the viability of this 
speech-protective alternative,273 need do no more than hold physical 
seizures unreasonable, leaving the procedural particulars to the 
political branches.274 
 
 273. See supra note 263. 
 274. As explained above, the Court in some cases invalidated seizures of obscenity because 
the seizures violated the First Amendment, in other cases because the seizures were 
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This proposed framework derives from a general order 
promulgated by the District of Columbia Police Department in July 
of 2012. The order “recognizes that members of the general public 
have a First Amendment right to video record . . . [police 
officers] . . . acting in an official capacity in any public space.”275 It 
prescribes that so long as recording does not interfere with an 
officer’s safety, officers may not order citizens to stop recording or 
even obstruct filming.276 Finally, the order addresses recordings 
reasonably thought to contain evidence of a crime: 
If [an officer] has probable cause to believe that a . . . recording 
device contains . . . evidence of criminal acts, the [officer] shall 
request that the person . . . voluntarily transmit the images or sound 
via text message or electronic mail to the [officer’s] official 
government electronic mail account.277 
By constructively imposing this procedural requirement on 
police departments,278 courts could at a stroke solve every First 
Amendment problem raised by cell phone seizures. Following 
electronic transmission, the citizen-recorder retains and is free to 
disseminate a video recording, obviating the threat of prior restraint. 
The citizen likewise retains the phone itself, and so is spared the 
inconvenience that occurs when a phone is seized. Moreover, because 
the phone user, not the officer, retrieves and sends the video, the 
procedure implicates no privacy concerns. There seems little chance, 
then, that seizures-by-transmission will chill protected speech. 
What is more, the procedure protects law-enforcement interests 
almost as well as would blanket authority to physically seize cell 
phones: in a seizure like the one in New Haven, the law’s legitimate 
interest in preserving evidence attaches entirely to the video, not to 
 
unreasonable under the Fourth. See supra note 143. Convinced of the notion of “constitutional 
reasonableness” underlying Roaden and espoused by Professor Amar, see Amar, supra note 53, 
at 805, this Note adopts the latter position.  
 275. D.C. POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER NO. 304-19, VIDEO RECORDING, 
PHOTOGRAPHING, AND AUDIO RECORDING OF METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
MEMBERS BY THE PUBLIC 1 (2012), available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_304_19.pdf. 
 276. Id. at 2. 
 277. Id. at 3. If a person refuses either to give the recording device to police or to transmit 
the file electronically, the officer must call his or her supervisor, explain the justification for the 
seizure, and, if justified, retain the device for only as long as it takes to secure a warrant. Id. at 
4–5.  
 278. That is, by simply holding a physical seizure is unreasonable, leaving the political 
branches to implement the suggested procedure (or a similarly effective one). See supra note 
262. 
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the recording device.279 The one plausible drawback that comes to 
mind is delay. In most cases, it would probably take longer to arrange 
electronic transmission than to physically seize a phone. 
That should rarely matter. Time is often of the essence when 
police act, but an officer trying to obtain evidence of a crime has 
shifted from crime response to crime investigation. It seems doubtful 
that many officers would begin to actively gather evidence from 
bystanders until the scene had been secured and safety restored, and 
in the vast bulk of cases, those circumstances should allow time for 
electronic transmission. In New Haven, for instance, officers had ably 
subdued the suspect by the time Rubino demanded Gondola’s phone. 
In the rare cases when police believe they must physically seize a 
phone to preserve evidence, an exception may be appropriate. Such 
seizures work First Amendment harms, so it is sensible to turn to 
First Amendment doctrine and subject them to strict scrutiny,280 
permitting only those physical seizures necessary to serve a 
compelling government interest.281 The government doubtless has a 
compelling interest in preventing crime,282 but most physical seizures 
would fail for tailoring: if the video would be needlessly cumulative 
evidence, or the officer could have delayed seizure until the scene was 
secure, or another officer could have effected a seizure-by-
transmission, then the physical seizure would have been unnecessary. 
The state’s low success rate in physical-seizure cases,283 and the rarity 
 
 279. Indeed, there is a good argument that this arrangement serves law enforcement better 
than a blanket authority to seize. Insofar as the present regime deters citizens from recording, it 
prevents evidence from coming into existence in the first place. The Court has adopted this 
reasoning to justify the creation of evidentiary privileges: if a person knows that the words he or 
she utters in a psychotherapy session can later be used as evidence, the words will never be 
uttered. The government is similarly situated under the privilege regime and the no-privilege 
regime—it has no usable evidence in either case—so the no-privilege regime should be rejected 
as denying a benefit to the privileged party without conferring a complimentary advantage on 
the government. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1996) (“Without a privilege, much of 
the desirable evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek access—for example, admissions 
against interest by a party—is unlikely to come into being.”). 
 280. A species of balancing test that is, as described above, not entirely foreign to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. See supra note 263. 
 281. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (describing strict scrutiny’s 
interest and tailoring requirements). 
 282. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). 
 283. These would nearly all be civil rights actions brought by citizen-recorders. The criminal 
defendants captured on video would play little role in vindicating the rights of their filmers, 
because only a party whose own Fourth Amendment rights have been violated may assert them. 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978). 
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with which officers will feel the need to resort to them, should result 
in few physical seizures—and a citizenry free to guard the guards. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, citizens like Jennifer Gondola have exploited 
new technology to capture footage of police misconduct and 
disseminate it to a wide audience. By monitoring and criticizing the 
administration of government, citizen recorders act in the First 
Amendment’s greatest tradition. Their conduct is protected by its 
guarantees. But Fourth Amendment doctrine, as enunciated in 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, permits in many cases on-the-ground 
evidentiary seizure of cell phones used to record arrests. Such 
seizures can function as particularly dangerous prior restraints on 
speech, and they also chill important First Amendment behavior. 
Zurcher held that Fourth Amendment procedure is generally 
sufficient to protect First Amendment interests when expressive 
materials are seized, but courts should be hesitant to apply that 
holding to cases like Gondola’s. When Zurcher limited speech 
protection to the Fourth Amendment’s strictures, it relied on two 
critical conclusions: the facts before the Court carried neither a 
danger of prior restraint nor the risk of chilling protected speech. Cell 
phone seizures present both threats. With respect to Gondola’s case, 
Zurcher’s thesis fails. 
Courts should therefore look beyond Zurcher to cases like 
Marcus v. Search Warrant, in which the Court found that the seizure 
of alleged obscenity functioned as a prior restraint and would chill 
protected speech. In Marcus and its progeny, the Court held that 
those dangers rendered otherwise unobjectionable seizures 
unreasonable, justifying the imposition of heightened procedural 
requirements crafted to protect expressive interests. 
Cell phone seizures deserve heightened protection in the 
tradition of Marcus. The best solution is for courts to simply hold 
such seizures unreasonable, permitting the political branches to 
prescribe electronic transmission as the proper means of “seizure.” 
Such a regime would serve law enforcement as well as the one in 
place today, if not better. And it would guarantee to the people a 
powerful new tool to vindicate an interest more ancient than the First 
Amendment itself. 
